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Considering Multiple and Overlapping
Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism,
National Sovereignty, "Global" Intellectual
Property, and the Internet
KEITH AOKI*
INTRODUCTION
The Internet is not a threat to sovereignty, and sovereignty is not a threat
to the Internet. By rejecting the formulation of the question, "Is the Internet a
threat to sovereignty", I do not mean to suggest that our notions of sovereignty
are not currently undergoing profound transformations (they certainly are) or
that the Internet has had no role in bringing about those transformations (it
certainly has). My intent is instead to point out how certain liberal assumptions
about the Internet under the "Rule of Law" may be hard-wired into our
information policy and legal discourse. Consequently, there is a marked trend
toward favoring ideas like "upward harmonization" and other universalizing
moves and a concomitant discounting or erasure of the "local", with disturbing
effects on the political economy of information that flows through global
networks such as the Internet.'
There is no single monolithic concept of sovereignty to be threatened-we
already live in a world of multiple, overlapping, contradictory, and oftentimes
intensely contested sovereignties.' Professor Ethan Katsh writes:
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. LL.M., 1992, University of
Wisconsin Law School; J.D., cum laude, 1990, Harvard Law School; M.A., 1986, Hunter College; B.F.A.,
Wayne State University. Thanks are due to James Boyle, Margaret Chon, Rosemary Coombe, Ruth Gana, and
Ileana Porras, whose works continue to educate me. Thanks also to my colleague, Ibrahim Gassama, for his
comments and to Professor David Fidler for inviting me to participate in this symposium.
1. See Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1293 (1996).
2. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED CoMMuNrTIEs: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF
NATIONALISM 4 (1991).
[N]ationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word's multiple
significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular
kind.... [W]e need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in
what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such
profound emotional legitimacy. I will be trying to argue that the creation of these
artefacts towards the end of the eighteenth century was the spontaneous distillation of
a complex "crossing" of discrete historical forces; but that, once created, they became
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[W]e are in an interconnected and overlapping set of spaces
rather than in a world where territory discretely and
definitively separates sovereign states.... [While the] ability
to move information across borders at electronic speed will not
replace either political entities or manufacturers of durable
goods.., it does change our experience with political and
economic entities, our relationship with them, and the
relationships between and among such entities.
The issue of boundaries, and the impact of the new media
on boundaries of all kinds, is one of the core issues of
cyberspace. The blurring of physical boundaries occurs
because communication is no longer dependent upon
transportation. Those in control of physical
boundaries-nation-states-lose some ability to control
communication that might, quite literally, have been stopped
at the border.... [B]oundaries of power are affected in several
other ways, each of which places pressure on models of
regulation that exist .... [A]s boundaries are crossed, as
overlapping jurisdictions are established, and as information
sharing occurs, the application of concepts such as sovereignty
and the use of distinctions such as public/private,
ownership/access, foreign/local; external/internal, and
economic/political will raise more questions than they did in
the past . . . . rN]ew spaces are being created and, with
considerable imagination, new maps will be drawn to represent
new spheres of authority and new models of state/nonstate
relationships?
Granted, the liberal vision of sovereignty and idea of the traditional nation-
state underwrite Professor Perritt's well-made argument that, far from heralding
the death of the nation-state, the Internet may actually contribute to shoring up
"modular," capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness,
to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide
variety of political and ideological constellations.
Id.
3. M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104
YALE L.J. 1681, 1713, 1715, 1717 (1995).
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traditional concepts of sovereignty. However, that vision may fail to account
completely for a number of convergent trends that are occurring outside of the
traditional liberal cleavage of the world into the public sphere (the state) and the
private sphere (the market, the family, the individual). Rather than rejecting
Professor Perritt's cogent arguments, I would suggest that we might usefully
supplement his arguments with a chastened awareness of the complex ways that
sovereignty has fractured and is undergoing important mutation at the twentieth
century's end.
I will briefly review Professor Pen-itt's arguments, then discuss three
tendencies: (1) reconfiguration of the public/private distinction; (2) loss of faith
and disillusionment in political institutions and ideals; and (3) multiplication of
different types of spaces. These tendencies, on certain levels, underline
Professor Perritt's point that rapidly globalizing information flows may
strengthen the salience and sovereignty of national boundaries, although in
problematic ways. I will then argue that the powerful discourses of
globalization and "difference" problematically use "information" and cross-
border "information flows" as a heuristic category closely related to the idea of
"property"--in such away that consistently favors certain types ofsovereignty
and disfavors others. The distributive patterns produced by the intersection of
a particular form of the sovereign nation-state (and their related intellectual
property and other laws) and the Internet may tend to favor the "public"
sovereignties of developed nations such as the United States. These patterns
may also favor the "private" sovereignty of firms that function in a
transnational mode but that are economically linked to the nations of the
developed world. This favoritism occurs at the expense of poorer nations,
groups, and individuals in the developing regions of the world and in pockets of
immiseration within the developed world. This article will conclude that, ifwe
are to develop an equitable global, or rather planetary, economy of information,
4. Duncan Kennedy describes the "liberal" vision of the "Rule of Law":
In the liberal model, law plays a major role in the form of "the rule of law," a defining
element in the liberal conception of a good society. But the content of the background
of legal rules is seen to flow either as a matter of logic from regime-defining first
principles (rights of bodily security, private property, freedom of contract) or from the
will of the people, or from both together in some complex combination. The distributive
issue is present, but understood as a matter of legislative intervention (for example,
progressive taxation, labor legislation) to achieve distributive objectives by
superimposition on an essentially apolitical private law background.
DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE POWER ANDPOLMCS OFCULTURALIDENT1TY 90
(1994).
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we must find a representational (political and otherwise) grid that manages to
describe these heretofore largely invisible and plural sovereignties.
I. PROFESSOR PERRITr'S REJECTION OF THE IDEA THAT THE INTERNET IS A
THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY
Professor Perritt rejects the view voiced by Walter Wriston (and others)'
that sovereignty is seriously eroded by the rise of global networks such as the
Internet. These critics, whom Professor Perritt refers to as "realists" (as
opposed to "liberals," in whose ranks Professor Perritt counts himself), advance
four interrelated arguments to support their thesis that sovereignty is imperiled
by the Internet: (1) that the spread of information and communication
technology embodied by the Internet erodes sovereign power over economic
activity;6 (2) that international cooperation is undermined due in large part to
jurisdictional conundrums on the formal level as well as substantive differences
in culture, value, and legal norms of different nations;7 (3) that the Internet
seriously threatens a sovereign state's ability to control political or social events
occurring within its boundaries;' and (4) that nettling questions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and effects of national legal regimes pose
insurmountable obstacles to international cooperation.9
Instead, Professor Perritt argues that the Internet strengthens both national
and international governance, shoring up the "Rule of Law" by: (1)
strengthening international law by making treaties and other documents widely
available, thus paving the way for "virtual" diplomacy;"0 (2) promoting
increasing economic interdependence among nations and giving rise and
supporting institutions such as the World Bank and the World Trade
5. See, e.g., WALTERWRISTON, THETwILiGHTOFSOVEREIGNTY: HowTHEINFORMATIONREVOLUTION
ISTRANSFORMINGOURWORLD(1992); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law andBorders-The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996); Anne Wells Branscomb, Jurisdictional Quandriesfor Global
Networks, in GLOBALNErwoRFKs: COMPUTERS ANDTHE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION (Linda M. Harasim
ed., 1993). See also Carl S. Kaplan, Finding Government's Role in a Global Network, CYBER L.J. (July 10,
1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/1aw/071097law.html>.
6. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in
Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 423, 428 (1998).
7. Id. at 429-30.
8. Id. at 428.
9. Id. at 429.
10. Id. at 439.
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Organization;" (3) empowering non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the
market context; 2 and (4) supporting international security mechanisms. 3
The main point of this article is that the Internet is not a threat to
sovereignty and, that properly understood, the Internet is part ofa constellation
of factors that are multiplying and transforming our traditional ideas of
territorial-based, nation-state sovereignty. Furthermore, such transformations
may have extraordinary distributive and political effects, some of which may be
to reinforce and strengthen aspects of national sovereignty and supranational
governance.
It is vital to grasp the paradoxical aspects of such a transformation of
sovereignty as well-the world is increasingly homogenous, but the world is
also increasingly full of difference. In some ways this is parallel to the question
early twentieth-century physicists faced when pondering quantum
phenomenon-is light a "wave" or a "particle"? The answer was "both" or,
rather, "it depends." Similarly, when pondering sovereignty at the close of the
century, one must be able to conceive of the idea as simultaneously imperiled
and robust (albeit at different levels).
Professor Perritt acknowledges that his arguments are "expressly based in
the acceptance of the liberal vision of domestic and international politics...
[and that] [t]his vision is not universally accepted."' 4 However, I believe that
in addition to the dichotomy that Professor Perritt sees between liberalism and
realism with regard to theories of international relations, there are several other
positions that are on the table. As Professor Perritt says, "[c]yberspace has not
escaped the vortex of politics at the domestic or international level."' 5
Furthermore, certain perspectives outside of either liberalism or realism tend to
critique the incompleteness and ideological effects of such analytical
approaches. For example, both the realist and the liberal visions seem unable
to give a satisfying account of the tense intersection of what happens when the
discourse of globalization encounters the discourse of difference. This article
will discuss three contemporary fronts on which the traditional concept of
sovereignty has been contested-fronts that have produced multiplying,
overlapping, and mutating sovereignties in ways that challenge both the liberal
and realist perspectives. First, there is the pervasive and ongoing
1l. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at440.
14. Jd. at 441.
15. Id. at 442.
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reconfiguration of public and private spheres. Second, there is the widespread
disillusionment and loss of faith in political institutions and ideals. Finally,
there is the multiplication of spaces and loss of "place" that is characteristic of
this moment.
II. SOVEREIGNTY: THREE CONTESTED FRONTS
A. Rethinking the Public/Private Distinction
The pronounceme of the demise of the public/private distinction has been
going on for some time now, bringing to mind Mark Twain's observation that
reports of his death were greatly exaggerated. 6 Since at least the Legal Realist
critique of the public/private distinction from the 1920s and 1930s that
underwrote the rise of the American bureaucratic administrative state, the idea
that the public/private distinction is incoherent at best and pernicious at worst
has passed from iconoclasm to common sense to cliche. 7 What are we to make
of the public/private distinction's long shelf-life, reports of its demise
notwithstanding?
First, one should note the interpenetration of public and private that has
been occurring on levels from the local to the international. This functional
interpenetration greatly complicates traditionally conceived forms of
sovereignty, whether of local governments or nation-states--that is, public
institutions wielding sovereign power.'9 Increasingly, different types ofprivate
16. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1980); Symposium, The
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60
U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1993).
17. See LAURA KELMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-60 (1986); MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-960(1992); AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (Thomas Reed et al. eds.,
1993).
18. See Kaplan, supra note 5.
19. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 114.
Foucault's totalizing scheme... does not include the market, but rather brackets it. On
one side, there is the state, the Law-as-Sovereign nexus. On the other, there are
institutions--the army, the prison, the church, the mental hospital, the medical hospital,
the boarding school, the family-and professions. Foucault criticizes a particular vision
of the relationship between these bookends... shared by liberalism and Marxism. This
vision is that citizens either hand over power to the sovereign state, which then uses law
to order society, with the issue being the prevention of abuse of state authority
(liberalism), or have power expropriated from them by the ruling class (Marxism).
The first problem with this... analysis.., is that it overestimates the significance
of ordering by the state (or the capitalist class) and underestimates the autonomy of
[Vol. 5:443
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entities and institutions have assumed aspects of sovereignty, and hybrid
institutions have arisen that are neither fully public nor fully private.2" On the
local level, one need only observe phenomena such as the rise of limited equity
co-ops, Community Development Corporations, Community Land and Housing
Trusts, or even the historical beginnings ofthe Internet and its interrelationship
with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to see
that the line between public sphere initiatives and private markets has become
increasingly blurred.2 On the international level, as Professor Perritt points out,
one should note that the rise of NGOs of all sorts as well as industry-wide
consortiums (such as SEMATECH) demonstrate this blurring.
Alternately, Duncan Kennedy describes a vision, based on that of the 1930s
U.S. Legal Realists, in which the public is not seen as illegitimately "usurping"
the prerogatives of actors in the private sphere, but instead is thought of as
creating, maintaining, and indeed underwriting its very existence. In the
following quotation, one might easily imagine intellectual property rights as a
jointly produced social product which combines creative labor of an individual
or group with pre-existing works and ideas:
The state uses force to ensure obedience to the rules of the
game of bargaining over ajoint product. To the extent that
these rules affect the outcome, forcing the parties to settle for
x rather than y percent of the joint product, the state is
implicated in the outcome. It is an author of the distribution
actors in the institutional/professional sector, who do a great deal of "disciplinary"
ordering under broad grants of legal authority....
Second, the Law-as-Sovereign theory overestimates the autonomy of private actors
who delegate power to the state, because it leaves out of account the processes notjust
of control but also of "subject-creation" that are located in the liminal institutions.
Id
20. See Frug, Decentering Decentralization, supra note 16; Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996).
21. See Laura Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at its Viability, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 539 (1995); Duncan Kennedy, Neither the Market Nor the State: Housing Privatization
Issues, in A FouRTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, ANDTHE EMERGENCE OF NEw MARKET ECONOMIES 253
(Gregory S. Alexander et al. eds, 1994). See also KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 135 (1985).
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even though that distribution appears to be determined solely
by the "voluntary" agreement of the parties.'
However, this trend toward recognition of this functional interpenetration
of public and private is not without its critics. The Sagebrush Rebellion, "Wise
Use", and "County Rights" movements in the western United States insist on
reconstructing a strict demarcation between public and private spheres,
underwritten by a strongly conservative paleo-libertarianism that views
government intervention as an unmitigated evil.23 One may also note the
pervasiveness of libertarian rumblings in cyberspace.24 Furthermore, it is
important to distinguish between the ideological claims of "liberalism" and the
more radical "libertarian" claims. The "liberal" vision posits a somewhat
sanguine and relatively stable division between public and private spheres. The
"libertarian" vision posits the public and private spheres locked in a battle to the
death-the "libertarian" vision is driven by paranoia at the prospect of the
public realm "usurping" and smothering the private sphere."
22. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 85-86. See also Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and
Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980).
23. See United States v. Nye County, Nevada, 920 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1996) (challenging state
statute that presumed state and local jurisdiction over federal lands). See also Erik Larson, Unrest in the West,
TIME, Oct. 23, 1995, at 52; Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How it Began and Where
it is Headed, in LAND RIGrrs 1, 3 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995) (describing the genesis of the Wise Use
movement).
24. See generally, John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents
and Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property is Wrong), WIRED,
Mar. 1994, at 84; John Perry Barlow, A Cyberspace Declaration of Independence (Feb. 9, 1996)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/publications/JohnPerryBarlow/barlow/o296.declaration>; Esther Dyson et al., A
Magna Cartafor the Knowledge Age, NEW PERSPECTIVES QuRTmRLY, Fall 1994, at 26; Eric Huges, A
Cypberpunk's Manifesto (visited Apr. 28, 1998) <http://www.replay.com/cpunk/manifesto.html>.
25. James Boyle, Foucault In Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors 66
U. CriN. L. REV. 177 (1997).
[O]ne of the most striking things about the Net is the instability of the political
cartography. We divide our world up into continuous and opposing territories-public
and private, property and sovereignty, regulation and laissez-faire "solving" problems
by inquiring as to their placement on this map .... On the Net... concepts and
political forces seem to be up for grabs. Nothing illustrates this point better than the
debate over intellectual property on-line. In the digital environment, is intellectual
property just property, the precondition to an unregulated marketjust another example
of the rights that libertarians believe the state was specifically created to protect? Or is
intellectual property actually public regulation, artificial rather than natural, an invented
monopoly imposed by a sovereign state, a distorting and liberty-reducing intervention
in an otherwise free domain?
Id. at 180.
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The rhetoric of "usurpation"-that government has usurped the
prerogatives of the people-is an ideological claim. The claim that the public
sphere threatens to overwhelm the private-the reality that the reverse may be
occurring, rhetorically as well as actually-is masked. The demonized
Austinian-Hobbesian Absolutist state26 may be merely an ideological
strawperson hiding the serious normative and distributive effects such
"usurpation" claims may have." To show the power of this libertarian
construct, think for a moment about the literal history of the Internet-it began
as an ARPAnet, s which was paid for and subsidized by government monies.
That it can be plausibly advanced that the Internet is private and "pre-political"
in a libertarian sense evidences the imaginative grip this particular ideological
formation has."
There is something to the point that a clear distinction between public and
private spheres reflects fundamental differences in the types of tasks and
missions that institutions operating in either public or private realms undertake.
However, the libertarian critique of government more often than not claims that
public entities should be strictly held to the same standards (such as pareto
optimality) as those that govern private firms-that is, that government should
be run like a private business." The rhetoric of privatization and market
discipline thus becomes itselfa tool in eliding the distinction between public and
private-private standards of efficiency should drive all our institutions, and
those institutions that do not adhere to those standards should be considered
illegitimate. Unfortunately, what this valorization ofthe private obscures is the
26. JOHN AUSTN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1911); JOHNAUSTIN,THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1954); James Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition
of Positivism: Reflections on Language, Power, and Essentialism, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 383 (1987).
27. See generally Boyle, Foucalt in Cyberspace, supra note 25.
28. See generally BRUCESTERLING,THEHAcKERCRACKDOWN: LAWANDDISORDERONTHEELECTRONIC
FRONTIER (1992).
29. Boyle, Foucalt in Cyberspace, supra note 25, at 178.
For a long time, the Internet's enthusiasts have believed that it would be largely immune
from state regulation. It was not so much that nation states would not want to regulate
the Net, it was that they would be unable to do so; forestalled by the technology of the
medium, the geographical distribution of its users and the nature of its content. This
tripartate immunity came to be a kind of Internet Holy Trinity, faith in it was a
condition of acceptance into the community.
Id.
30. Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Private Right, 26 ENVr'L L.
1 (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (discussing the
difficulty of distinguishing "inalienability rules" from "property rules").
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fact that, in important ways, public and private institutions do have different
and not always contiguous functions. These institutions are significantly
mutually constitutive-public institutions such as legislatures, courts, and
agencies underwrite and make possible market transactions in the so-called
private sphere. Additionally, private institutions using pareto-maximizing
criteria do not always produce or accurately assess the value of things such as
environmental integrity, democratic governance, or a republican form of
government. Thus, rather than trumpeting the decomposition of the
public/private distinction, perhaps we should think of ways to reconstruct it in
an ideological climate that seeks to delegitimate public initiatives and valorize
a private realm filled with voracious, utility-maximizing, self-interested (and
newly-digitized) monads.
B. Addressing the Loss of Faith in Political Institutions and Disillusionment
in Ideals
The current loss of faith and disillusionment in political institutions and
ideals relates to the prior-mentioned reconfiguration of the public/private
distinction. One might start by noting that the United States has one of the
lowest proportions of eligible voter turnout in the world. Notwithstanding Ross
Perot's invocations of "electronic town halls", the Internet does not seem
imminently to herald a revived civic sphere. Fueled by angry and relentless
paleo-conservative and libertarian attacks bent on "getting government off our
backs and out of our pockets", it is unsurprising that many people and groups
are extremely cynical about public institutions on many different levels, from
the Internal Revenue Service to the local zoning board. Indeed, part of the
appeal of electronic cash systems, anonymous remailers, and strong encryption
is tinged with not-so-hidden libertarian politics: ifthe state cannot identify you,
then for all practical purposes, it cannot tax you either.3 Cyberpundit and co-
founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, John Perry Barlow, speculated
3 1. Ironically, as Professor Boyle points out, even as cyber-libertarians may try to cloak their financial
identities with encryption and anonymity, they may discover that "there is a difference between speech being
constitutionally protected and practically unregulable, indeed the latter situation may in some cases undermine
the former protection." Boyle, Foucalt in Cyberspace, supra note 25, at 178. See also Bruno Giussani,
Germany, Advancing Communications Law, Seeks to Give Internet Legal Framework, N.Y. TiMEs (June 17,
1997) <http:llwww.nytimes.com/library/cyber /week/061797germany.html> (discussing Germany's new
multimedia legislation that has "four main points [that] address the protection of children; the establishment of
a certification scheme for electronic transactions called "digital signature"; the tightening of rules for collecting
personal data, and the question of liability for illegal content circulating over digital networks.").
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at a conference in Oregon in late 1995 that the moment e-cash becomes viable,
taxes become voluntary-with predictable consequences for the tax-and-
transfer policies of the contemporary state.
32
On the domestic front, this disillusionment may be seen in: (1) the emerging
arguments about "reverse racism", formalist equality, "colorblindness", 3  and
cynical redeployment to contrary ends of the rhetoric of the U.S. Civil Rights
struggles of the 1960s in Post-Civil Rights America;34 (2) initiatives such as
California's Propositions 187 and 209;3" and (3) judicial decisions such as
Hopwood v. University of Texas Law School.36 On the global level, one may
note the decoupling of trade and human rights by the Clinton Administration,
with particular reference to United States-China relations. Or one may note that
while there is much to celebrate about the end of Apartheid in South Africa,
Apartheid's end may have been purchased at the expense of substantive
economic reforms--the same multinational firms that were major market actors
before the end of Apartheid are the same firms controlling the lion's share of
resources today.
As Professor Perritt suggests, the outlook here may not be totally bleak, as
the Internet makes possible interventions by NGOs in terms ofdissemination of
information and monitoring efforts with regard to environmental compliance and
human rights initiatives. However, as noted below, initiatives on both these
fronts are not unproblematic in their "universalizing" tendencies. The point of
noting this widespread disillusionment is not to say that the rhetoric of either
domestic civil rights or international human rights is exhausted.3" Quite the
opposite. In the context of thinking about three generations of human rights,
efforts to extend and create a third paradigm are critical at this juncture.
32. See Symposium, Innovation and the Information Environment, 75 OR. L. REv. (1996). Barlow's
comments were from an unpublished keynote address he presented at the conference.
33. See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
34. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in
Post-Civil Regime America, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 821 (1997).
35. Cal. Proposition 187 (1994); Cal. Proposition 209 (1996).
36. See Hopwood v. University of Texas Law School, 78 F.3d 932 (1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581
(1996).
37. See Louis HENKiN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
Many international law scholars recently refer to the idea of three
generations of human rights. 8 Digital speech and communication raise
important questions about the iterations of these rights. The first generation
consists of what might be thought of as "negative" rights-that is, rights against
state interference with free speech and expression, search and seizure without
a warrant, imprisonment without due process. 9 In essence, these are "freedom
from" unjustified exercises of state power against one's person and property.
In the digital environment, what are we to make of the troublingly incomplete
export of U.S. norms?' While we are eager to "internationalize" the reach of
our domestic intellectual property laws in agreements such as the TRIPs
component of GATT, NAFTA, or treaties promulgated under the aegis of
organizations such as WIPO, where is the concomitant desire to export free
speech norms of the First Amendment and the idea of "fair use"? The second
generation of human rights involves "affirmative" rights- that is, rights that
an individual may have that flow from an entitlement to state benefits, such as
food, education, medical care, clothing, or housing."' These rights arise in
conjunction with the growth and spread of the mid-twentieth century
bureaucratic administrative state and often involve a particular individual's
right to a hearing (or some type of due process) prior to termination of such
affirmative entitlements.
Legal formulation of the third generation of human rights has been the most
contentious. The third generation of human rights involves what might be
loosely characterized as group, or solidarity rights-rights possessed by a group
or groups within a society.42 Some of these rights challenge the individualist
assumptions that underlie much of the liberal discourse of "rights." For
example, how does one make a legal claim for redress for injury to the right to
a clean and healthy environment? How about a right to peace? Or a right to
development? One might look to some of the claims arising over environmental
38. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 177, 183 (1996).
39. Berta E. Hemandez-Truyol, Civil and Political Rights: An Introduction, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 223, 236 (1996).
40. Indeed, John Perry Barlow has said that "in cyberspace, the First Amendment is a local ordinance."
John Perry Barlow, Leaving the Physical World (last visited April 8, 1998) <http://www.eff.orglpubl
Publications/JohnPerry_Barlow/HTML/ieaving_the.physical-world.html>
41. See generally Iglesias, supra note 38.
42. Natsu Taylor Saito, Considering "Third Generation" International Human Rights Law in the
United States, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 387, 389 (1996); Ileana M. Porras, Reflections on
Environmental Rights as Third Generation Solidarity Rights, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 413, 415
(1996).
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racism as an iteration of some of these third generation human rights issues.
Why should the United Nations send observers to ensure "free and fair
elections" in Haiti but not Bossier Parrish, Louisiana, or Cook County, Illinois?
An important additional aspect of these new analyses of multiple and
overlapping sovereignties is the recognition of the complexity and contingency
of political boundaries-the very political units that constitute political
representation. Critical inquiry into the preconditions for democratic
empowerment and process is yet another link in this area between the local and
the global.43
Importantly, the chastened awareness of multiple and overlapping
sovereignties gives rise to the realization that there may be no "Democracy"
with a capital "D" or "Markets" with a capital "M", but that these institutions
have an extremely wide and variable spectrum of iterations and meanings. For
example, there are the social democracies of Western Europe and Canada, the
individualist vision of the United States, and the authoritarian markets of
Singapore or Hong Kong-at the least, contingency is the watchword.
Against this backdrop, crucial terms such as "democracy", "autonomy",
and "community" are being contested and are mutating rapidly. To the extent
that the rise and spread of global networks such as the Internet open these terms
to contestation, we are not witnessing the demise of sovereignty, but its
transformation.
C. Multiplication of Space(s) and the Loss of Place
To pull the two earlier strands together, one needs to grasp a central
paradox of globalization-the world is increasingly the same, but the world is
increasingly full of difference." A McDonald's Big Mac is the same in
Oshkosh or Kuala Lumpur, right? What understanding this paradox entails is
the realization that we are living in a world comprised of a dynamically shifting
matrix of overlapping, multiple, competing, and at times, contradictory
sovereignties-some private, some public, some tagged to a particular nation-
state, others without any clear geographic locus. It is unsurprising that there
43. Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/NationalImagination, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1395 (1997).
44. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REv. 237 (1996).
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has been a multiplication of space(s). The world is increasingly the same, yet
the world is increasingly filled with difference.
There are five homologous trends related to the multiplication of space and
the loss of place that are in play here. First, the connection between geography
and sovereignty has been disrupted, though to what extent is yet unclear. At the
very least, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and related East-West
geopolitical mapping of power relations suggests the disruption is great.
Traditionally, the connection between geography and sovereignty dealt with
fixed subjects in space-location is no longer a fixed or particularly stable
referent. Even the North-South mapping of the globe and related critiques of
underdevelopment and dependency turned in important ways on distinctions
between the First (the industrialized West), Second (the former Soviet Union
and its allies), and Third (the rest) Worlds.
Paulo Friere has pointed out how the periphery has folded into the
metropole, the margins have instantiated themselves in the center, and vice-
versa."' Immiseration within South Central Los Angeles may have more in
common (socially, economically, and even politically) with sweatshops in
Malaysia than with the downtown L.A. financial district. The map of the globe
at the end of the twentieth century is not of a planet blanketed by a reassuring
web of communications and transportation technology-the global is not
planetary in any sense of the word.' Whole continents are spanned or bypassed
by the supposed global Internet, as are entire regions within countries and
within cities. This map ofthe globe is notable for its lumpiness, its unevenness,
and its extremely bifurcated and patchy distribution of resources both within
countries and between countries, on every level, from the local to the
international. How and why these sharply differentiated spaces came into being
are pressing questions.
Second, the continuation and acceleration oftransnational global capitalism
and related economic restructuring challenge traditional notions of nation-state
sovereignty."7 In treaties and agreements such as GATT and NAFTA, the
45. PAULO FRIERE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 55 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 2d ed. 1993).
46. Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty, supra note I, at 1298.
47. Some of these macro phenomena involve wars, trade disputes, and IMF and World Bank investment
decisions affecting development. See Tariq Banuri, Development and the Politics of Knowledge: A Critical
Interpretation of the Social Role of Modernization Theories in the Development of the Third World, in
DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE 29, 63-65 (Frederique A. & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1990) (noting how
modernization and development in the Third World has been extremely lumpy, producing heightened levels of
unemployment and immiseration with significant "push" effects for immigration). For a description of the
changing dynamics of transnational capital flows, see David Slater, Contesting Occidental Visions of the
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traditional role of nation-states-as-sovereigns is challenged. Driven by free-
trade and market ideology, goods and capital increasingly flow relatively freely
across national boundaries-however when people try to cross those same
borders, at least for some, the national borders suddenly freeze shut.48
Additionally, in an increasingly borderless world, what are we to make of
environmental and labor regulation "races-to-the bottom",49 in which capital
flight is driven (or enticed) by the presence of ever cheaper labor and low or
nonexistent regulation elsewhere." Such capital flight also works to drive down
Global: The Geopolitics of Theory and North-South Relations, 10 MASA ALLA DEL DERECHO-BEYOND LAW
97, 108 (1995). "[W]ithin the poorer nation states of the world, the hegemony of the IMF and the World Bank,
and the privatization and liberalization they legitimize incorporates political mechanisms for representing the
interests of the industrialized West and their transnational corporations." Id.
48. On flows of labor within and across national borders, see PETER DIcEN, GLOBAL SHIFr: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATIoNOFECoNOMICACrlvrrY(2d ed. 1992) (examining multiple levels on which globalization
occurred in the 1980s); ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SocIALTHEORYANDGLOBALCuLTURE( 1992);
Robert W. Cox, Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Political Economy, in
PoLITICAL EONOMY ANDTHECHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 45 (Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds.,
1994) (critiquing effects of globalization through the lens of political economy).
49. Shifts from older Fordist models of standardized mass production to an emerging post-Fordist mode
of flexible accumulation fundamentally transform the relationship of a nation's economy with its territory.
Fordism was a relatively stable period in the U.S. when relatively high wages were paid to.assembly line
workers, enabling them to purchase more consumer goods. Fordism describes the brief period of equilibrium
where increasing mass production capability because of new technology (increasing supply) was balanced by
increasing consumption (increasing consumer demand for manufactured goods)-the workers in a Ford Motor
plant could afford to buy the Model T's they produced. As modes of production (because of transportation or
communications advances) became more "flexible" and specialized, the ability of capital to "flexibly
accumulate" was enhanced. Input costs, such as wages, energy cost, and state regulation could be reduced or
avoided by moving production to other regions or offshore to other countries where inputs were cheaper. This
creates a flexible accumulation race-to-the-bottom in terms of a search by multinational capital for areas where
labor unions are nonexistent, without minimum wage, employee safety, and environmental regulations. The
word "PostFordism" captures this shift to regimes of flexible accumulation. See MICHELAGLIETTA,ATHEoRY
OFCAPITALIST REGULATION: THEU.S. EXPERIENCE 122-130 (David Fembach trans., 1976); DAVID HARVEY,
THECONDITION OFPOSTMODERNITY: ANENQUIRYINTOTHEORIOINSOFCULTURALCHANGE(I 984); Charles F.
Sabel, Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies, in REVERSING INDUSTRIAL
DECLINE? INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND POLICY IN BRITAIN AND HER COMPETITORS 17, 17-19 (Paul Hirst &
Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1989).
50. See e.g., DAVID J. ELKINS, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: TERRITORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 27 (1995). See also Slater, supra note 47, at 101-02.
[Globalization] is a process which refers to the "multiplicity of linkages and
interconnections between the States and societies which make up the modem world
system," being in essence a phenomenon by which events, decisions and activities in one
part of the world can significantly impact individuals and communities in quite distant
parts ofthe globe. In one sense, it implies a grouping of processes whereby politics and
social activities are "becoming stretched across the globe;" and, in another sense, it
captures an "intensification in the levels of interaction, inter-connectedness or
interdependence between States and societies which make up the world community."
Id. (citing A. McGrew, Conceptualizing Global Politics, in GLOBAL POLITICS (S. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
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wages within the United States and can be a significant hinderance to
environmental or labor regulation as well as to union organizing."
The third trend is homologous with the rest-the end-of-the-century
communications "tsunami" that is sweeping across the planet. At the very
least, the "wired" experience of life in cyberspace gives rise to a sense of
identity and affiliation that is shifting, multiple, fluid, and overlapping. We are
also witnessing an emergence of a transnational, cosmopolitan52 "information
class" of symbolic analysts that reside in "metropoles", or "global cities." This
information class, through its lightning-fast communications technology, directs
and redirects the flows of vast amounts of capital and resources across the globe
to varying and oftentimes disturbing ends. The spaces of these information age
metropoles are important for what they tell us about the distribution of and
access to scarce resources.
The fourth trend involves what might be thought of as postcolonial
struggles that involve challenges, direct or otherwise, to the state monopoly on
the use of force. Groups such as the Zapatistas, led by Subcommandante
Marcos in the Chiapas region of Southeastern Mexico," the First Peoples of
Canada,' or the various permutations of the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty
Movement" represent challenging reassertions of sovereignty, particularly when
51. See BENNET HARRISON&BARRYBLuEsroNETHEGREATU-TuRN: CORPORATE RESTRUCnRINGAND
THE POLARIZATINGOFAMERICA (1988); Marlene Dixon et al., Reindustrialization and the Transnational Labor
Force in the United States Today, in THE NEW NOMADS: FROM IMMIGRANT LABOR TO TRANSNATIONAL
WORKING CLASS 101 (Marlene Dixon & Suzanne Jonas eds., 1982).
52. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 83-84 (1996).
53. LaJournada (visited May 10, 1998) <http://www.cs.oberlin.edu/students/pjaques/ezln/marcos-int-
etal.html> (describing interview with Subcomandante Marcos); Two Years After Someone in Mexico Finally
Said 'That's Enough" (visited May 10, 1998) <http://www.physics.mcgill.ca:80/WWW/oscarh/RSM/96
twoyearhistory.html>; Two Winds From the Southeast (visited May 10, 1998)
<http://www.peak.org/-justin/ezln/SE-in-two-winds.html>. See generally Zapatistas in Cyberspace (visited
May 10, 1998) <http://www.eco.utexas.edu:80/Homepages/Faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html> (describing
Internet resources dealing with the Zapatistas).
54. John Borrows, Contemporary Traditional Equality: The Effect of the Charter on First Nation
Politics, 43 U.N.B. L.J. 19 (1994); Patrick Maclem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and the
Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1993); William Pentney, The Rights of Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada and the Constitution Act of 1982, Part : The Interpretive Prism of Section 25, 22 U.B.C. L. REV.
21 (1988); Ellen Turpel, Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural
Differences, 6 CAN. HUMAN RTS. Y.B. 3 (1989-90)
55. Carey Goldberg, Native Hawaiians Vote 'in Ethnic Referendum: Weigh Possibility of New
Government,N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1996, atA6; Mindy Pennybacker, Should the Aloha State Say Goodbye?
Natives Wonder, THENATION, Aug. 12, 1996, at 21; Bill Weinberg, The Sovereign Nation ofHawai 'i, Come
Again?, HIGHTIMES (Sept. 1996) <http://www.hightimes.com/ht/mag/9609/hawaii.html>. For acomparison
ofthe First People's movement, Zapatista movement, and the Hawai'ian Sovereignty movement, see Anthony
DePalma, Three Countries Face Their Indians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at D3.
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many sophisticates have declared that sovereignty is dead, or at the least, has
become seriously "unbundled." In some ways, these assertions of sovereignty
by indigenous peoples resemble the claims by women and people of color who
claimed the mantle of "authorship" in their efforts to open up the Western
literary canon, only to be told by some poststructuralist critics that "authors"
were dead. 6 Sovereignty (and "authorship") are important, and often
empowering, claims to make, involving notions of self-proprietorship and
autonomy. However, one must also recognize that our received accounts of
sovereignty are fracturing, eroding, multiplying, and splintering before our very
eyes.
Closely related to reconfiguration of the idea of sovereignty is the idea of
nationalism." Benedict Anderson has written about the "imagined
communities" of the traditionally understood nation-state-a nation may be
understood as a group of persons that are unified by a "text", the nation-state."'
We are watching the multiplication of texts of the nation-state. How are we to
understand the claims of Queer Nation, White Trash Nation, Pan-Islam,
Christian Fundamentalism, the Kurds, the Catalonians, or the Montana
Freemen? What is the connection between sovereignty and identity politics?
Notwithstanding the attenuation of the connection between geography and
sovereignty, we must consider what the claims of people who do not possess or
occupy a legally recognized geographic space mean-particularly when identity
may be iterated or announced in the spacelessness of cyberspace. 9
The fifth and final trend is a concatenation of the prior homologous trends
and involves the spectre of imminent and increasing environmental disruptions.'
56. See generally WHAT IS AN AUTHOR? (Maurice Biriotti & Nicola Miller eds., 1993); JONATHAN
CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION (1982).
57. See ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 158-77
(1996) (examining the rise and intersection of new kinds of nationalisms with constructions of race and gender
identities); Stuart Hall, The Global and the Local: Globalization and Ethnicity, in CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION
ANDTHEWORLtD-SYsTEm: CONIEMPORARYCONDmONSFORTHEREPRESENTATIONOFIDeIrY (Anthony D. King
ed., 1991) (describing the problematic relation interms of representation of increasingly global economic
production and localized racial, ethnic, religious and gender identities).
58. ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 4.
59. See Margaret Chon, Radical Plural Democracy and the Internet, 33 CAL.WEsT. L. REv. 143, 145
(1997).
60. On distribution of environmental risks and burdens, see Banuri, Development and the Politics of
Knowledge, supra note 47, at 30-31.
[There] is the increasing association ofmodernization and development with ecological
disasters: the devastation oftropical rain forests and mountain watershed, the deleterious
(and unanticipated) ecological consequences oflarge dams and large irrigation systems,
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On a macro level, this involves cross-boundary issues such as global warming
and oceanic degradation. On more micro levels, consider the environmental
disruption entailed by the spread of American patterns of lifestyle and
consumption in the developing world. For example, there has been a steady
decline in the practice of subsistence farming and agricultural practices in the
developing world that are being pushed out by big transnational agribusiness.
Newly dispossessed and displaced, former subsistence farmers head for urban
areas in search of work. These new urban migrants put increasingly heavy
burdens on basic public services, such as water, police, fire, medical, and
educational needs. However, many governments in the developing world are
simultaneously under serious pressure from institutions such as the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) who have made massive
development loans to such countries to cut back on "unnecessary" social
services and to "privatize."' This places public institutions in these countries
in the middle of a nasty squeeze. On one hand, there is the risk of serious social
disturbance and civil unrest if too many vital services are withheld or cut back.
On the other hand, the solvency of the national economy is put in jeopardy if the
government cannot meet IMF or World Bank-imposed "austerity" measures."
These three tendencies-the reconfiguration of the public/private
distinction, loss of faith in political institutions, and the multiplication of
space(s)--have converged to produce overlapping and plural sovereignties.
Properly understood, the Internet is an important element in these trends, but
cannot be singled out as a unique threat to sovereignty.
the loss of subsistence agricultural land to desertification in Africa and to water-logging
and salinity in Asia, and the high energy-requirement and vulnerability of modem
technologies.
Id. See also William A. Plummer, Immigration Project, The Big Push: Emigration in an Age of
Environmental Catastrophe, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 231 (1996) (describing the links between
development policies that produce ecological and social shifts that work to drive people, particularly poor
people, out of the developing world as environmental refugees).
61. See JOHN WILLIAMSON, THE PROGRESS OF POLICY REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (1990) (discussing
neoliberal economic policies advanced by the IMF and World Bank including fiscal disciple, involving trade
and foreign investment liberalization, privatization, and domestic market deregulation).
62. See Enrique R. Carrasco, Opposition, Justice, Structuralism, and Particularity: Intersections
Between LatCrit Theory and Law and Development Studies, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 313 (1997).
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF "UPWARD HARMONIZATION"
Moving from general observations about ongoing changes occurring to our
concept of sovereignty, the area of intellectual property law is as good a field
as any to examine some of the ideological and legal transformations wrought by
the discourse of globalization. Problems in international protection of
intellectual property rights on the Internet raise the question-how to assert the
stability of territorial borders against technological advances that render those
borders porous and problematic? Perhaps our traditional concepts of
sovereignty are being asked to carry more freight than they can bear, or at least
bear without deep transformation.63 The United States tends to privilege and
expand the rights of domestic intellectual property owners in the face of
assertions of political sovereignty of other nations, such as China.' 4 Global
accords and treaties seeking to harmonize intellectual property laws (via
"upward harmonization" as the standards of protection rachet up) further
underwrite the sovereignty of domestic U.S. intellectual property owners.65
63. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of GA TTs Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects
for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & Er.
L.J. 171 (1993) (discussing the integration of intellectual property issues into international economic law). See
also William P. Alford, How Theory Does-And Does Not-Matter: American Approaches to Intellectual
Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8 (1994); William P. Alford, Intellectual Property,
Trade and Taiwan: A GA 77-Fly's View, 1992 CoLuM. Bus. L. REv. 97 (examining how changes in Taiwan's
approaches toward intellectual property relate to American policy and the GATT).
64. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, U.S. Set to Impose Limited Trade Sanctions on China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 1996, at A9 ("With conflicts bubbling over intellectual property rights... Administration officials say they
cannot ignore the violation of China's vows on cooperating to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons....").
See also Fareed Zakaria, China: Appease... Or Contain?: Speak Softly, Carry a Veiled Threat, N.Y. TIMES,
(Magazine), Feb. 18, 1996, at 37 ("To avoid sparking crisis after crisis, Washington should ask itself what
Chinese actions would threaten its core interests and values.").
65. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATIONINFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OFTHE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS2
(1995). See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 14, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1197, 1201; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,32 I.L.M. 296,605; J.H. Reichman
& Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. Rv. 51 (1997); J.H. Reichman,
Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INT'L L. 345 (1995); Pamela Samuelson, The US. DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L
L. 369 (1997); Seth Schiesel, GlobalAgreement Reached to Widen Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1996, at 1,38 (quoting Bruce Lehman, U.S. PTO Commissioner: "These treaties we've been working on will
be the cornerstone of international economic law for the information and technological age of the 21 st century
.... And would for the first time create international recognition of rights already in U.S. Law .... ); Archive
of WIPO Database Protection (visited Apr. 15, 1998) <http://www.essential.org/listproc/info-policy-notes>
(Archive assembled by James Love of the Consumer Project on Technology). For a pre-TRIPs overview, see
Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism,
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At first glance, a uniform international standard for intellectual property
protection seems like an eminently sound idea in the abstract (at least to those
in the developed world who control growing numbers of increasingly valuable
intellectual property rights).' However, as the discussion turns from the
abstract to the specific, problems emerge over definitions of seemingly
elementary questions such as what is a "fixed original work of authorship", or.
for that matter, who or what is (legally) an author. Even within the United
States, answers to these questions may vary wildly. Note that the very concept
of intellectual property, particularly with respect to the digital information
environment, has an extremely wide range of iterations and possible definitions
ranging from the strongly maximalist recommendations of the Commerce
Department's failed 1995 White Paper to the radically nonprotectionist (and
somewhat hallucinatory) views of John Perry Barlow. 7 Variations one might
find between countries such as the United States and China-with sharply
different political, historical, legal, cultural, and social understandings regarding
the meanings of cultural production-can be striking. The discourse of
globalization collides with the discourse of difference. Widely divergent
concepts of property and ownership, originating in extremely diverse political,
76 IOwA L. REv. 273 (1991); Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of
the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1995).
66. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J.
INT'LL. 505,549 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, Comment, ExtraterritorialityandMultiterritoriality in Copyright
Infringement, 37 VA. J. INr'L L. 587 (1997).
67. Barlow writes:
Since we don't have a solution to what is a profoundly new kind of challenge, and
[we] are apparently unable to delay the galloping digitization of everything not
obstinately physical, we are sailing into the future on a sinking ship.
This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright and patent law, was developed to
convey forms and methods of expression entirely different from the vaporous cargo it is
now being asked to carry....
Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are taking three forms: a frenzy of deck
chair rearrangement, stem warnings to the passengers that if she goes down, they will
face harsh criminal penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial .... We will need to
develop an entirely new set of methods as befits this entirely new set of circumstances.
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the
Digital Age, WiRED, Mar. 1994, at 85 (reprinted with changes at <http://w.eff.org/pub/Publications/
John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/ideaeconomyarticle.html>).
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economic, and social circumstances, provide the fuel for hotly contested and
seemingly unresolvable disputes."
Because legal regimes differ sharply from country to country, trying to
establish an international baseline for intellectual property protection proves
problematic. The question quickly turns into one of deciding whose national
baseline and standards of protection will become the international default. Even
as the TRIPs component of GATT has established certain baseline standards
of protection,69 the baseline of United States domestic copyright law may be in
the process of being drastically raised. In turn, this racheting up of domestic
standards of intellectual property protection has the potential to change TRIPs
into an agreement that underwrites an international copyright grab by United
States intellectual property industries.7"
Recently, there has been a spate of calls for adoption of internationalized
versions of U.S. intellectual property standards of protection on a global scale,7
but with paradoxical effects. Traditional territorial and political notions of
sovereignty are undermined by moves toward providing rights in information
qua information. As information flowing across borders through global
networks such as the Internet is reconceived as intellectual property and
becomes less embedded in physical objects like books, the scope of property
68. See WILLiAMP.ALFORD,TOSTEALABOOKisANELEGANTOFFENSE: INTELLECTUALPROPERTY LAW
IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 3 (1995) ("American policy regarding intellectual property law has been based on
fundamental misconceptions about the nature of legal development and is therefore in need of major
reformulation."); Marcus W. Brauchli, Chinese Flagrantly Copy Trademarks ofForeigners, WALLST. J., June
20, 1994, at B2 ("Pirated music accounts for halfof China's nearly $700 million ayear in recording sales. And
the software industry estimates that 94% of the software sold in China is fake, a loss [the] industry puts at $595
million."); Seth Faison, Razors, Soap, Cornflakes: Pirating Spreads in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at
D2 (quoting Joseph T. Simone, a Hong Kong attorney: "In most countries, if you have 10 pirates, you can go
after one, expect seven to stop, and then figure out how to get the remaining two.... But in China, when you
go after one, the other nine see exactly what you're doing. Not only do they keep pirating, but you invite 10
more to join in."). On February 27, 1995, the day that the People's Republic of China and the United States
signed a Memorandum of Understanding that China would more stringently enforce its recently enacted
copyright law, the New York Times ran a story describing how test versions of Windows 95, not released in the
United States until August 1995, were selling for forty dollars a copy in Hong Kong. See Edward A. Gargan,
Pirate's Bazaar Thrives in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at DI. See also Seth Faison, US. and
China Sign Accord To End Piracy of Software, Music Recordings and Film: Washington Drops Plan to
Impose $1 Billion in Trade Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at AI.
69. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPs and Dispute
Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275,276 (1997).
70. See Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134, 135-36 (arguing that the
White Paper's proposals give too much control to the publishing and entertainment industries). See also Neil
W. Netanel, Comment, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPs Dispute
Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441 (1997).
71. See World Intellectual Property Organization Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, Dec. 1996.
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rights steadily expands. At the urgings of members of the intellectual property
industry, many decision makers begin opting for international intellectual
property protection norms and frameworks. This contributes to the
transformation and reconfiguration of national and territorial sovereignty that
we are witnessing in the current period-particularly because entities holding
increasingly large blocks of intellectual property rights are not nations but
private multinational corporations. However, rather than positing the Internet
as a threat to such sovereigns, the rise of the Internet, as Professor Perritt points
out, may represent a reinforcement of national sovereignty, albeit ironically.
The irony is that such entities must then return to assertions of the sovereignty
of domestic intellectual property laws to underwrite their ownership claims.7
Transnational corporate entities, whose fortunes are built on protecting their
intellectual properties, need to turn to nation-states to ensure protection for their
private rights.
The pattern in expanding intellectual property protection that has emerged
has been to "whipsaw" domestic and international protections against each
other. The United States will first sign onto a multilateral treaty like GATT,
which provides for "minimum standards" of intellectual property protection.
Next, there are moves to ratchet up similarly domestic levels of protections,
which in turn exerts pressure on other treaty nations to likewise increase
protections." The end result is that minimum standards of protection become
driven by a maximalist domestic intellectual property protection agenda.
A. The False Dichotomy Between "Free" Traders and "Fair" Traders
Treaties such as the TRIPs component of GATT discuss the more neutral-
sounding "removal of barriers to trade" when dealing with intellectual property
protection. The architecture of GATT says to the countries of the developing
world, "In exchange for reducing or eliminating tariffs on goods like cotton, so
you can export them, you must agree to protect the intellectual properties of the
developed world." Thus, the cotton that goes into a Mickey Mouse T-shirt will
pass out of Malaysia at, say, one dollar a pound and returns as a T-shirt
emblazoned with a trademarked image selling for twenty-five dollars.
72. Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 1293.
73. For example, see the recently enacted "No Electronic Theft Act" signed by President Clinton on
Tuesday, December 16, 1997, "that targets Internet software piracy by making it a criminal act to share
copyrighted materials-even if there was no profit involved." Jeri Clausing, Clinton Signs Internet Copyright
Act, N. Y. TIMES, CYBER TIMES (Dec. 17, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber>.
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These types of results and arrangements implicate the "ideology of
harmonization."74 This ideology works to mediate tensions between "free"
traders and "fair" traders in discussions of international trade policy with regard
to intellectual property protection (or international environmental, labor, or
human rights discourses). The free/fair trader dichotomy is closely related to
a "non-normative"/"normative" dimension applied to the claims of the
respective proponents of free and fair trade. Both the free and fair trade claims
have a disturbing capacity to work toward discounting and disfavoring the
articulation of pockets of significant domestic difference that should, at the very
least, be approached with respect rather than disdain. Why is it that when there
is a conflict between the global and the local, the local iterations and differences
tend to be discounted and subordinated to the idea of upward harmonization?75
There is an acute tension between "autonomy" and upward harmonization
with regard to standards of intellectual property protection in the TRIPs
component of GATT or with regard to the environmental protection provisions
of NAFTA. The supposedly non-normative arguments of free traders for
ostensibly "neutral" converging standards of intellectual property protections
(as articulated by experts in ostensibly non-political international institutions
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization) seem to be involved
intimately with the project of reducing international difference-all to assure the
maximization of supposedly non-normative "free flow" of cross-border trade.
Ostensibly autonomy and sovereignty of individual states are respected, but it
is only when one begins examining patterns of distributive results that a
troubling bias towards the interests of the developed world becomes apparent.
On the other hand, there are the arguments of the fair traders who, in a
perverse version of "public choice" exit theory, argue for harmonization of rules
so as to prevent intellectual property law "races to the bottom"-this argument
is also invoked with regard to labor or environmental regulatory policy. There
is the fear voiced by countries such as the United States or Western European
nations (perhapsjustifiable, but nonetheless troubling) that if developing nations
are able to enter into competition with them for easily relocatable capital and
manufacturing plants, the countries of the developing world will be able to
74. See Ileana M. Porras, The Puzzling Relationship Between Trade and Environment: NAFTA,
Competitiveness, and the Pursuit of Environmental Welfare Objectives, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65
(1995). See also Porras, Reflections on Environmental Rights as Third Generation Solidarity Rights, supra
note 42, at 413.
75. Ileana M. Porras, Resisting the Irresistible: Difference Under Pressure in the Age of Fair
Trade-Finding the Limits of Harmonization (unpublished paper, on file with author).
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underbid the developed nations because of lower levels of intellectual property
protection that such firms have in the developed nations (particularly with
regard to the ease of copying that digital technologies and transborder networks
such as the Internet provide). These fair traders then argue that intellectual
property protections (or in many cases, labor or environmental regulatory
standards) must be upwardly harmonized so as to place the developed and
developing world on a "level playing field." 6
This rhetorical move has a certain force. Poor and developing nations, who
come to the global table with a pre-existing, uneven distribution of resources
(particularly with regard to information economies that have a large component
of intellectual property) are constructed in international trade agreements such
as GATT (or NAFTA) as partaking of "unfair competitive advantage" because
they do not adhere to the "fair" trader-nation's higher levels of intellectual
property protection or other regulatory standards (and concomitant higher costs,
which are then reflected in higher-priced goods that comport with prices of
goods from developed nations and which are, ostensibly, more "competitive").'
When critics of this international version of "blame-the-victim" raise the point
that these "fair" regimes may play a large role in perpetuating existing
distributive inequities between nations ofthe developed and developing world,
they are often told they are obstructionist advocates of inefficient (and harmful)
domestic/local difference. Under this analysis, free trade and fair trade are not
polar terms-fair trade is not an oppositional regime to free trade, but an
extension of it.
Prevailing constructions of harmonization are advanced by individuals,
firms, institutions, and NGOs promoting international social-welfare
objectives-human rights, labor, and environmental agendas.S Because these
groups (to varying degrees) make universalizing claims, a byproduct and
consequence of their successful efforts may be the reduction of significant
domestic/local/international difference. Without rejecting these initiatives out
of hand, one must note the synergy between "social-welfare" driven
harmonization (which needs to surmount the set of arguments about national
76. Larry Cata Backer, Harmonization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An Essay on the
Dynamics of Opposition Within Federative and International Legal Systems, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
185, 185 (1997).
77. Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now - The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C.L. INT'L L.
& COMP. J. 291, 293 (1995).
78. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to
Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987 (1995).
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autonomy and sovereignty) and "trade-efficiency" driven harmonization. With
regard to the agendas advanced by proponents of both "free" and "fair"
trade, nations will sometimes allow their "sovereignty" to be breached if such
breach is seen as in a nation's economic interest.
As Professor Ilena Porras has pointed out, the ideology of "harmonization
seem[s] to offer simultaneously convergence and difference .... [However]
appearances are deceptive and the promise is an empty promise. Harmonization
does not favor difference; rather it takes account of the fact that it will take time
to eliminate difference altogether and is willing to accommodate deviance
temporarily." '79 Rather than leaving us with the deflated, empty husk of a
demystified harmonization,"0 this article suggests that there is much work to be
done in the important project of developing a limiting counterprinciple to
harmonization, such as the European Union's limiting principle of
"subsidiarity."'
B. Embedded Norms of Global Intellectual Property Protection
What are we to make of the patterns of distribution produced by the
political economy of intellectual property, and how do they relate to legal
regimes tied into the liberal vision of globalization? The intersection of
intellectual property protection and the discourse of globalization privileges six
dominant (but somewhat contradictory) norms and presumptions within Anglo-
American legal thought: (1) a supposedly clear distinction between categories
of public and private; (2) a sharp, but troubled distinction between the
categories of property and speech/expression; 3 (3) an Enlightenment-
79. Porras, Resisting the Irresistible, supra note 75.
80. Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699 (1991).
81. George A. Berman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and
the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331(1994). See also MARC WILKE& HELEN WALLACE, SUBSIDIARITY:
APPROACHES TO POWER-SHARING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1990).
82. Symposium, A Symposium on the PubliclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982);
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 102-109 (1987).
83. Note that along with a sharp distinction between property and speech norms in the intellectual property
area, there is a tendency toward privileging property norms over free speech norms. See Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993) (criticizing the marked tendency of
intellectual property courts to "subject intellectual property to the same free speech principles that limit other
assertions of governmental power.... [Tihe courts have too often turned a deaf ear to these arguments. The
incantation 'property' seems sufficient to render free speech issues invisible."). See also Keith Aoki, Authors,
Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain. PART 11, 18
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191 (1994); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property, Subjects of Politics:
Intellectual Property Law and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1853 (1991); Rochelle Cooper
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derived, linear, "onward-and-upward" vision of"progress;"'M (4) a deeply-held
commitment to and belief in an open "marketplace of ideas" in which a
pluralism of views proliferate; 5 (5) a faith (at least up until fairly recently) in
the transparency of language;86 and (6) a foundational belief in the
commensurability of all things- that is, that all things may be reduced to a
common metric understood by all, whether they are widgets, dollars, or bytes
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language In the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTREDAMEL. REV.
397 (1990); Allan C. Hutchinson, Talking the GoodLife: From Free Speech to Democratic Dialogue, 1 YALE
J.L. & LIB. 17 (1989); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 159. See also Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F. 2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub. nom.; O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods.,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979); San FranciscoArts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987);
White v. Samsung Elec., Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43
DE PAUL L. REV. 97, 99-100 (1993) ("We can infer from the term 'Progress of Science and the useful Arts' an
Enlightenment faith in knowledge, whether it be knowledge for its own sake or for other ends.... [The
Enlightenment] tradition... accords 'Progress' a privileged status... [and]... ignores 'the dark side of reason'
..... ). See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U.CI. L. REV. 1017(1989). Compare THoMAs S. KUHN,THESTRUCTUREOFSCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970), with PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (ed. rev. 1988).
85. See Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)(Holmes, J.,
dissenting)
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by fiee trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. See also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859); Letter from James Madison to W T. Barry, August 4,
1822, in THE COMPLETE MADISON (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953). "A popular Government, without popular
information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge
will forever govern ignorance; and people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives." Id.
86. On a bel ief in and critique of the transparency of language, involving, among other things an inquiry
into the relation between the idea of language as an agent of social construction and a vision of the human
subject as polymorphous, and decentered, see STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE,
RHETORIC AND THE PRAcTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); INTERPRETING LAW &
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Stephen Mailloux eds., 1988). See also Pierre
Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929
(1988); Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1631 (1990); James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal
Studies and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY
(Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976); PIERRE BOURDRIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER (Gino
Raymond Matthew Adamson trans., 1991); RAYMOND WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS IN MATERIALISMAND CULTURE
(1980); PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966).
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of information."7 To varying degrees, on a very deep level, our narratives of
globalization incorporate these assumptions.
There is a circular quality to the constitutive tension between national and
the international standards of intellectual property protection because each
depends on the other for integrity. A territorially-based intellectual property
system like that of the United States needs to be reinforced by the equivalent of
reciprocity in a global.economy, or U.S. sovereignty suffers. Alternately, arm-
twisting by the United States regarding compliance with rising standards of
intellectual property protection may be viewed as deleterious to the sovereignty
of a foreign legal regime to determine its own standards of protection. In
traditional international law terms, the dilemma of international intellectual
property protection might be characterized by referring to the increasingly
threatened ability of sovereign nation-states to make autonomous policy choices
regarding appropriate levels of intellectual property protection within their own
territorial boundaries." Moves by the developed nations such as the United
States toward generally liberalized global trade (including greater reciprocity
of intellectual property protection) might also be cast in terms of national
capitulation to the inexorable and unavoidable march of globalization.89
Treaties such as GATT potentially shift responsibility for setting standards
of intellectual property law and policymaking away from national/local sites
into less democratic,.international arenas.' However, one must be aware that
such an analysis has serious limitations. Dichotomizing the international and
87. For critiques of the commensurability of all things, see Martha Nussbaum, Plato on
Commensurability and Desire, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 106 (1990); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 1993 DuKEL.J. 56; MargaretJane Radin,Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1877-87 (1987); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994); Richard Warner,
Incommensurability as a Jurisprudential Puzzle, 68 CI-KENT L. REV. 147 (1992).
88. David Held and Anthony McGrew describe the increasing constraints on national policy makers as
nothing less than a "crisis of the territorial nation-state." David Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization and
the Liberal Democratic State, 28 Gov'T & OPPosrTON 261, 262 (1993).
89. See William P. Alford, Perspective on China: Pressuring the Pirate, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at
M5.
90. Carlos A. Primo Braga, The Economics oflntellectualPropertyRights andthe GA 71.- A View From
the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989). See also J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in
International Trade: Opportunities andRisks ofa GA TTConnection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 747 (1989);
Ricardo Grinspun & Robert Kreklewich, Consolidating NeoLiberal Reforms: Free Trade as a Conditioning
Framework (May 27-29, 1994) (unpublished paper, presented to the International Conference on Economic
Integration and Public Policy: NAFTA, the European Union and Beyond, York University, Toronto). "The new
trading arrangements effectively remove many economic and social policy objectives from democratic
consideration. These policy changes are directed to inhibit governments from engaging in interventionist
policies in particular in the area of export promotion and import protection." Id.
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the national implies an illusory separation between the two that obscures the
constitutive role of sovereign nation-states in constructing and participating in
these supra-national arenas. One must also be careful about reifying the idea
of the "processes of globalization"--doing so makes globalization appear as a
largely unproblematic, homogeneous unitary phenomenon following some kind
of pre-ordained course, notwithstanding the six assumptions attendant to
globalization set out earlier, as well as to the three tendencies noted in Section
II. If globalization is not a transhistorical unitary process but is instead a
heterogeneous, lumpy, incomplete, and uneven set of tendencies with large
regions of the world bypassed, then a "one-size-fits-all" approach towards
international intellectual property protection may reproduce, on a global scale,
problematic and sharp inequalities that currently exist with regard to access and
information. These sharply bifurcated inequalities are already characteristic of
much development on the domestic, regional, or national scale with regard to
questions of distribution of information access and resources.
By focusing on international multilateral solutions to current dilemmas,
questions regarding appropriate levels of intellectual property protection that
recognize certain industry-specific considerations and constraints (such as those
pertaining to computer programs, which are different from those pertaining to
television broadcasts transmitted by satellite or from digitized music or film)
within the Global Information Infrastructure9 risk being suppressed or lost
entirely by a near-automatic reflex toward -more and higher standards of
intellectual property protection. This tendency seeks to "universalize"
information at the lowest common denominator and seemingly blames rapidly-
advancing communications technology for much of what is politically
controversial and contradictory about the "global information economy" n-is
the Internet a threat? Thus the politics of global change in specific places are
91. Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private International Law and Questions of the
GlobalInformation Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIOrr Soc'y 318, at 316 (1995) ("A key of the G.I.I. is its ability
to render works of authorship pervasively and simultaneously throughout the world. The Principle of
Territoriality becomes problematic if it means that posting a work on the G.I.I. calls into play the laws ofevery
country in which the works may be received when... these laws differ substantively... [and] for works on the
G.I.I., there will be no physical territoriality; no way to stop works at the border, because there are no borders.").
But c.f Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, supra note 44, at 237.
92. This term has been frequently used both in journalistic and scholarly writing to encompass some of
the dramatic economic changes that have occured in most countries in recent decades. As in the case of
globalization, widespread usage has not led to a more precise definition. See ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO
OWNS INFORMATION?: FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLic AccEss (1994); Cox, Global Restructuring, supra note 48,
at 45-59. See also John Huey, Waking Up to the New Economy, FORTUNE, June 27, 1994, at 36; Jane C.
Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 318.
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never seriously examined or confronted. Indeed, such places are marginalized
and exceptionalized, which is particularly ironic given that such spaces are
produced in great part by the international political economy of intellectual
property in the first place.
The much-vaunted "spacelessness" and seemingly decentralized nature-
culturally, politically, and economically- ofvarious electronic communication
networks are seen as promoting an equalization of economic and social
disparities, both within the United States and globally, at least on a superficial
level. This profoundly ideological vision of radical decentralization seems to
rely on a belief in the determinacy of technology--decentralized
communications networks will perforce produce decentralized economic and
political forms, sooner rather than later. In important ways, this over-sanguine
view overlooks how mapping electronic space as "private" creates conditions
under which a "privately constructed and owned electronic information system
... embod[ies] the essential features of a private enterprise economy: inequality
of income along with the production of goods and services for profit."'93 This
structural inequality is deepened and accentuated by the added capabilities of
digital information technologies (mobility, flexibility, simultaneity) along with
the fact that market forces will tend to offer greatest incentives for those parties
that cater to the needs and tastes of consumers with the highest incomes in the
most developed sectors of the economy in the most developed nations and
regions. Generally and unfortunately, liberal legal thought has a very difficult
time seeing this as a problem, let alone responding affirmatively.
CONCLUSION
With regard to the intersection of the discourse of globalization and the
discourse ofdifference, Rosemary Coombe has written that globalization entails
an articulation of local and non-local forces given voice in cultural idiom. The
world is increasingly connected, but it is increasingly also full of difference.
We need representational vehicles that enable us to remain sensitive to
93. See HERBERTI. SCHILLER, INFORMATION INEQUALTY: THE DEEPENING SOCIAL CRISIS IN AMERICA 23
(1996).
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diversities of meaning, even as we acknowledge the shaping power of processes
that at first seem monolithic, homogenizing, and all-encompassing."
The liberal vision of globalization, as partially articulated by Professor
Perritt, presupposes a representation of our world in which there exists a
discrete and demarcated "public sphere" that rational, autonomous individuals
("citizens") may access and in which they exchange information and ideas.
While such a presumption may be both ethnocentric and culture-bound, it may
also be built into our legal system and discourse at a very deep level. However,
such a presumption about a public sphere inhabited by citizens is in acute
tension with other presumptions contained within the idea ofglobalization, such
as the idea that globalization implies a meaningful dialogue with "others"-a
"talking with", rather than a "talking to"--the intersection with the discourse
of difference. This further presumes that there is both a willingness as well as
an ability on "our" part to take such dialogue seriously. However, because this
also involves a serious commitment to critique and transform our legal
categories in response to such dialogue, such meaningful communicative
dialogues with "others" may rarely occur. That this does not seem t6 be
occurring often, if at all, is troubling, especially when we use universalizing and
transhistorical rhetoric in our discussions about globalization. As increasing
pressures are brought to bear on our received visions of sovereignty and
intellectual property, whether arising on the Internet or elsewhere, the
increasingly pervasive intersections and interactions between the global and the
local desperately need to be reconceived as opportunities rather than obstacles
to a more equitable global intellectual property regime.
This article has examined some of the issues raised by Professor Perritt's
observations regarding the idea that the Internet might be viewed as a threat to
sovereignty. While agreeing with Professor Perritt's rejection of the idea that
the Internet is a threat, as well as with his observation ofthe "double-sidedness"
and slipperiness of arguments in this area, this article parts company with
Professor Perritt on several points. First, the reconfiguration of the
public/private distinction, the loss of faith in political institutions and ideals, and
the multiplications of spaces in our contemporary situation are insufficiently
accounted for by prevailing liberal legal ideology, and these gaps may have
significant policy consequences. Secondly, the liberal vision of the global tends
to have a deep bias toward "universalizing" strategies, as well as a tendency to
94. See Rosemary Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to Law and
Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 791,801-04 (1995).
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disguise relative distributive inequities (at least in the area of international
intellectual property protections). Finally, while this article agrees with
Professor Perritt that the Internet is not a threat to sovereignty, and that
sovereignty is not a threat to the Internet, it is important to understand the deep
and fundamental transformations our idea of sovereignty is undergoing at the
end of the twentieth century, the rise of the Internet notwithstanding.

